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Background: Approach and avoidance motivation for alcohol are relatively independent, and they operate in both
automatic (or implicit) and controlled processes. In this study, we adapted methods previously used in the appetite
literature and implicitly primed an alcohol-related motivational orientation (approach or avoidance) in order to
investigate its influence on the opposing motivational orientation, in a group of non-dependent heavy drinkers.
Methods: Participants (N = 110) completed computerised measures of attentional bias and avoidance for alcohol
cues (visual probe task) and behavioural approach and avoidance for alcohol cues (Stimulus–response Compatibility
(SRC) task). Word primes were subliminally presented during each trial of these tasks. Participants were randomly
allocated to groups that were exposed to alcohol-appetitive primes, alcohol-aversive primes, or neutral primes.
Results: Contrary to hypotheses, word primes had no effect on responding during the visual probe or SRC tasks.
Supplementary analyses revealed that participants showed attentional avoidance of alcohol cues combined with
slower behavioural avoidance responses to alcohol cues. Attentional bias was positively correlated with scores on
the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test.
Conclusions: In contrast to previous findings from the appetite domain, our findings suggest that automatic
alcohol cognitions are unaffected by implicit priming of motivational orientations, although features of our novel
methodology may account for these results.
Keywords: Alcohol, Ambivalence, Approach tendencies, Attentional bias, Implicit cognition, PrimingBackground
Motivational conflict (or ambivalence) arises when people
experience two goals that are incompatible with each
other. The ambivalence model of craving (Breiner et al.
1999; McEvoy et al. 2004) proposes that the decision to
consume alcohol depends on the balance between motiv-
ation to indulge (‘approach’, e.g., wanting to drink at a
party) and motivation to refrain (‘avoidance’, e.g., not
wanting to drink at the party because of work commit-
ments the next day). Therefore, alcohol use should vary
according to which system is more activated at any one
time (Ostafin et al. 2003). Evidence to support the concept
of separable approach and avoidance motivation exists in
the domains of alcohol use (McEvoy et al. 2004) as well as* Correspondence: mfield@liv.ac.uk
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and MacLeod 2004).
Multiple factors are known to influence the relative
strength of alcohol approach and avoidance motivation,
both of which can operate in automatic and controlled
processes. Automatic (or implicit) processes are activated
spontaneously, are difficult to control, and the individual
may be unaware of their operation. On the other hand,
controlled (or explicit) processes are rule-based, reflective,
and they operate within conscious awareness (Stacy and
Wiers 2010). Dual-process theories suggest that both
automatic and controlled processes play an important
role in the development and maintenance of alcohol use
disorders (Wiers et al. 2007). It is suggested that initial
alcohol involvement is the result of a controlled process,
in which drinkers weigh up the pros and cons of drinking
versus not drinking. However, with extensive experience
of drinking, automatic processes are strengthened and
they come to control drinking behaviour, eventually over-td. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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2008). Other theoretical models based on brain adapta-
tions (Robinson and Berridge 1993) make similar predic-
tions: after repeated alcohol use, automatic motivational
processes are strengthened and they influence drinking
behaviour irrespective of the subjective benefits or costs of
drinking.
Researchers within the addiction field have focussed
on three types of implicit cognitions: attentional bias,
approach tendencies, and spontaneous memory associa-
tions. Attentional bias occurs when an individual shows
increased attention for particular stimuli (e.g. pictures of
alcohol) compared to alternative stimuli, (e.g. pictures of
furniture). There are several ways to measure attentional
bias, and one of the most commonly used is the visual
probe task (Field et al. 2004). In a typical version of this
task, two matched pictures are presented on a computer
screen for a brief period, before a visual probe replaces
one of the pictures. The participant’s task is to respond
to the probe as quickly as possible. In such a task involv-
ing alcohol and neutral pictures, attentional bias would
be inferred if the participant was faster to react to probes
that replaced alcohol pictures (congruent trials), rather
than probes that replaced neutral pictures (incongruent
trials). If, however, this pattern were reversed (i.e. partici-
pants were faster to react on incongruent trials), this
would suggest attentional avoidance of alcohol cues. Sev-
eral studies have shown that heavy drinkers who are not
seeking treatment have an attentional bias for alcohol cues
(Field et al. 2004; Townshend and Duka 2001), whereas
alcohol-dependent participants who are tested in treat-
ment contexts show initial attentional bias (when pictures
are presented very briefly, e.g. 50-100 ms), that is followed
by attentional avoidance (when pictures are presented for
longer periods of time, upwards of 500 ms) (Field et al.
2013; Noël et al. 2006; Stormark et al. 1997; Townshend
and Duka 2007; Vollstädt-Klein et al. 2009). This mixed
pattern of attentional bias may reflect automatic ‘ambiva-
lence’ in alcohol dependent participants, with appetitive
motivational processes mapping on to the initial atten-
tional bias and aversive motivational processes mapped on
to the subsequent attentional avoidance (see Field et al.
2013, for discussion).
Automatic approach and avoidance tendencies elic-
ited by alcohol-related cues have been assessed with the
alcohol-related stimulus–response compatibility (SRC)
task (Field et al. 2008) and related tasks (Wiers et al.
2009). In the alcohol SRC task, a manikin is presented
on a computer screen either above or below an alcohol-
related or neutral picture. Participants must move the
manikin towards or away from the pictures as quickly
as possible. On some blocks of the task, participants
must make the manikin move towards alcohol pictures
and away from neutral pictures, whereas these instructionsare reversed in other blocks of the task. Automatic
approach tendencies for alcohol cues are inferred if
participants are faster to respond on blocks of the task
when alcohol pictures require the ‘approach’ movement in
comparison to blocks when alcohol pictures require the
‘avoidance’ movement. By contrast, if participants are fas-
ter on the ‘avoid alcohol’ blocks compared to the ‘ap-
proach alcohol’ blocks, this would suggest that alcohol
cues evoke automatic avoidance tendencies. Any observed
approach or avoidance bias reflects an automatic process
because, although participants are explicitly instructed to
approach and avoid different types of pictures as quickly
as possible, differences in the speed of responding dur-
ing ‘approach alcohol’ and ‘avoid alcohol’ blocks are not
under intentional control (see Watson et al. 2012, for a
review). Heavy drinkers who are not seeking treatment
display automatic approach tendencies for alcohol cues
(Christiansen et al. 2012; Field et al. 2011; Field et al.
2008; Kersbergen et al. 2014). Two studies that adminis-
tered the task to alcohol-dependent patients in treat-
ment settings reported conflicting findings: no reliable
bias in either automatic approach or avoidance evoked
by alcohol cues was reported in one study (Barkby et al.
2012) whereas faster avoidance rather than approach,
which was predictive of subsequent relapse, was re-
ported in another study (Spruyt et al. 2013). One reason
for these findings with alcohol-dependent patients is
that the standard version of the SRC task yields an index
of automatic approach that is relative to avoidance, there-
fore the pattern that is observed in heavy drinkers who are
not seeking treatment (Christiansen et al. 2012; Field et al.
2011; Field et al. 2008) can be attributed to either strong
automatic approach, weak automatic avoidance, or a com-
bination of the two. Among alcohol-dependent patients, if
alcohol cues simultaneously evoke strong automatic ap-
proach at the same time as strong automatic avoidance,
this may explain why this group display either no reliable
bias on the standard version of the task (Barkby et al.
2012) or a bias to faster avoidance (Spruyt et al. 2013) de-
pending on the strength of their motivational orientations
to avoid alcohol at the time of testing.
Our goal in the present study was to experimentally
manipulate alcohol approach and avoidance motivational
orientations using a subliminal priming procedure, in
order to investigate their influence on automatic atten-
tional biases and approach and avoidance tendencies.
Previous research into the cognitive processes that are
involved in dietary restriction has shown that a goal
state can be primed subliminally (below the threshold
of conscious awareness), and this has the effect of sup-
pressing cognitive processing of information related to
the conflicting goal state (Stroebe et al. 2008). In two
experiments, participants who were attempting to restrict
their food intake (in order to lose weight) completed a
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sented and then masked so that they did not cross the
threshold of conscious awareness. Primes were either neu-
tral words or words that were intended to activate the goal
of eating enjoyment, such as ‘tasty’ or ‘chocolate’. Immedi-
ately after this, target words related to either the conflict-
ing goal (dieting), neutral words, or non-words (random
letter strings) were presented, and participants were re-
quired to rapidly identify whether a word or a non-word
was presented. The primary finding was that participants
who had been subliminally primed with words related to
eating enjoyment were subsequently slower to identify tar-
get words that were related to dieting. The authors inter-
preted their findings as indicating that subliminal priming
of one goal (eating enjoyment, in this case), led to a sup-
pression of the competing goal (dieting in order to lose
weight, in this case), which manifested as slower identifi-
cation of diet-related words.
In the current study we aimed to modify and extend
the work of Stroebe et al. (Stroebe et al. 2008) and explore
the effect of subliminally priming one motivational orien-
tation on the opposing motivational orientation, in rela-
tion to automatic cognitive processing biases for alcohol
cues. Participants completed measures of attentional bias
and automatic approach tendencies whilst their motiv-
ational orientation was subliminally primed on a between-
subjects basis. We opted for a between-subjects design in-
stead of a within-subjects design (in which motivational
orientation could be primed on a trial-by-trial basis) in
order to maximise the potency of the priming intervention
and to eliminate the risk of carryover effects from one trial
to the next (Brooks 2012). Our primary hypotheses were
that, in relation to participants who were subliminally
primed with neutral words, participants who were sub-
liminally primed with alcohol-appetitive words would
show elevated attentional bias for alcohol pictures that
were presented for 50 ms and 500 ms, and increased
automatic approach tendencies and reduced automatic
avoidance tendencies. In participants who were sublim-
inally primed with alcohol-aversive words, we predicted
the complete opposite pattern of results to that expected
for the alcohol-appetitive group. We also investigated the
relationships between automatic alcohol cognitions, their
counterparts in controlled (self-reported) processes, and
individual differences in drinking behaviour and hazardous
drinking, in an attempt to replicate previous demonstra-
tions of associations between these constructs (Barkby
et al. 2012; Christiansen et al. 2012; Field et al. 2005;
Field et al. 2009).
Methods
Participants
One hundred and ten heavy drinkers (41 male, 69
female, mean age, M = 32.54, SD = 8.01) were recruitedfrom various sites in the North West of England (e.g., local
businesses, the University campus, and hospitals). Our
sample size was informed by Ostafin & Brooks (2011) who
reported a small-to-medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.28)
for the effects of negative mood induction on automatic
alcohol approach tendencies with a total N of 65 partici-
pants, who were divided into two groups. Inclusion cri-
teria were: (i) aged between 25 and 60 years (ii) English
as first language, (iii) heavy drinkers (those who drank
in excess of UK Department of Health guidelines for
‘safe drinking’, which are no more than 14 units per
week for women and 21 units per week for men; 1 UK
unit = 8 g alcohol), and (iv) normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Exclusion criteria included: (i) current or
past alcohol or other substance dependence, (ii) cur-
rently suffering from acute mental health difficulties,
(iii) positive breath alcohol level. The study was ap-
proved by the University of Liverpool Research Ethics
Committee and the National Health Service (NHS) Re-
search Ethics Committee (because some participants
were NHS staff recruited from NHS premises). All par-
ticipants provided written informed consent to take part
in the study.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three
groups: alcohol-appetitive, alcohol-aversive, or control.
Groups did not differ significantly in terms of gender ra-
tio, χ2 = 3.92, p = .14, highest level of education achieved,
χ2 = .70, p = .95, or current employment status, χ2 = 6.33,
p = .18. Table 1 shows variables related to alcohol con-
sumption and scores on the Alcohol Use Disorders
Identification Test (Saunders et al. 1993) and subscales
of the Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire
(McEvoy et al. 2004). Possible pre-existing differences
between groups (alcohol-appetitive, alcohol-aversive, con-
trol) on these variables were investigated using a series of
One-Way ANOVAs, but there were no significant group
differences (ps > .1).
Materials
Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire
(AAAQ) – ‘right now’ version (McEvoy et al. 2004)
This 14-item questionnaire comprises three subscales.
The ‘inclined/indulgent’ subscale captures mild approach
inclinations to drink, the ‘obsessed/compelled’ subscale
captures intense approach inclinations, and the ‘resolved/
regulated’ subscale captures inclinations to avoid drinking.
Respondents are asked to rate how strongly they agree
with each item, on a 9-point Likert scale anchored from
0 (not at all) to 8 (very strongly).
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT)
(Saunders et al. 1993)
This 10-item self-report questionnaire measures patterns
of alcohol consumption that are hazardous to health.
Table 1 Self-report data
Alcohol-appetitive (N = 38, 15 Male) Alcohol-aversive (N = 36, 9 Male) Control (N = 36, 17 Male)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F p
AAAQ Inclined-Indulgent 4.01 2.37 4.41 2.11 4.20 2.21 .30 .74
Resolved-Regulated 1.79 1.10 2.02 1.11 2.02 1.22 .50 .61
Obsessed-Compelled 0.89 1.29 1.33 1.46 1.21 1.84 .81 .45
AUDIT 9.13 4.24 11.25 4.84 9.83 3.69 2.34 .11
TLFB Units 42.18 29.59 42.22 24.13 44.20 36.10 .05 .95
Drinking days 5.79 3.03 5.83 2.54 6.20 3.20 .18 .84
Note. AAAQ = Approach and Avoidance of Alcohol Questionnaire – Right Now; AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; TLFB = Time Line Follow Back
(diary of alcohol consumption): Units = Total units consumed in two week period before study (1 unit = 8 g alcohol), Drinking days = Total number of days on
which alcohol was consumed in two week period.
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above indicate hazardous drinking.
Timeline followback (TLFB) retrospective drinking diary
(Sobell & Sobell 1992)
This is a retrospective diary on which participants record
their alcohol consumption over the previous fortnight.
Such a relatively short timeframe can be used with little to
no loss in the accuracy of the data (Vakili et al. 2008).
From this, we calculated the number of drinking days each
week, and the total volume of alcohol consumed.
Presentation computer
All computer tasks were programmed in Inquisit soft-
ware (Millisecond Software 2006) and were presented on
a laptop computer with a 15-inch monitor that was set
to a refresh rate of 60Hz (equivalent to one screen refresh
every 17 ms).
Pictorial stimuli
We used a set of 10 pairs of alcohol-related and matched
control pictures, which were a subset of the picture pairs
used in previous studies (Barkby et al. 2012; Jones et al.
2012). Each alcohol picture depicted a close-up of an al-
coholic drink or a person holding or consuming an alco-
holic drink, and was matched with a perceptually similar
picture depicting items of office equipment and stationery,
or people interacting with those items. We also used 8
pairs of neutral-neutral pictures, which were neutral
pictures drawn from the International Affective Picture
System (Lang et al. 2008). All pictures measured 95 mm ×
130 mm when presented on the screen.
Masked priming stimuli and procedure
We selected thirty prime words (see Table 2) for use in
the visual probe and SRC tasks. These were 10 alcohol-
appetitive words, (e.g. ‘party’), 10 alcohol-aversive words,
(e.g. ‘nausea’), and 10 neutral words, (e.g. ‘bookshelf ’).
The process for selecting the words was as follows. We
initially created a list of 32 alcohol-appetitive andalcohol-aversive words based on words from the lexicon
of alcohol and drug terms published by the World
Health Organization (World Health Organisation 1994),
and additional words suggested by the authors. In a
small pilot study, this list was presented to 22 people
(who did not participate in the main study) who were
asked to select 20 words that would be most likely to
encourage (10 words) and discourage (10 words) them
from drinking alcohol. The 10 most frequently endorsed
words in each category were selected for use in the
study. Finally, a list of 10 neutral words relating to items
of furniture was created. This category was selected due
to its neutral emotional valence and lack of conflict with
the neutral and control pictures presented in the com-
puter tasks. All three categories of primes were matched
on number of letters and syllables.
The masked priming procedure was embedded at the
start of each trial of the SRC and visual probe tasks. The
procedure that we adopted was based on our review of
the masked priming literature (Degner et al. 2007; Frings
and Wentura 2003; Klauer and Musch 2003; Kouider
and Dehaene 2007; Moors et al. 2010; Van den Bussche
et al. 2009; Wentura and Degner 2010). Firstly, partici-
pants were instructed to focus on a forward mask, in the
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which was presented on the screen for 500 ms. This was
followed by the prime word, with random letters placed
either side in order to make it the same length as the
mask letter strings, for 34 ms. Finally a backward mask
(‘gmwkyxzsqnhvrpf ’) was presented for 51 ms. There-
fore, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was 85 ms.
Previous results suggest that these timings are optimal
for priming effects (Greenwald et al. 1996; Hermans
et al. 2003; Wentura and Degner 2010; Wentura et al.
2005). Immediately afterwards, the target stimuli were
presented (see below), and we applied a response win-
dow in line with recommendations for maximising
masked priming effects (Draine and Greenwald 1998).
Due to the nature of the visual probe and SRC tasks, the
length of the response window varied between tasks, as
detailed below.
Visual probe task
This is an established tool for the measurement of atten-
tional biases for substance-related cues in substance users
(Field et al. 2004; Townshend and Duka 2001). On each
trial, following presentation of the forward mask, prime
and backward mask (as detailed above), a pair of pictures
was presented on the left and right hand sides of the com-
puter screen for either 50 ms or 500 ms. Immediately after
picture offset, a small dot probe appeared on either the left
or right hand side of the screen, to which participants
were required to respond by pressing a key on the left
or right hand side of the keyboard, as quickly as possible
and within a response window of 500 ms. In addition to
trials with alcohol and matched control pictures, we
also included ‘neutral-neutral’ trials in which a pair of
neutral pictures was presented; these trials were included
in order to distinguish biases in attentional orienting
and attentional disengagement on the primary (alcohol-
control) trials (Koster et al. 2004).
The task consisted of two blocks, one in which picture
pairs were presented for 50 ms and another in which pic-
ture pairs were presented for 500 ms. Block order was
counterbalanced across group. Each block comprised 10
practice and buffer trials, in which neutral-neutral picture
pairs were presented, followed by 100 critical trials, com-
prising 80 alcohol-control trials and 20 neutral-neutral tri-
als, which were presented in a new random order for each
participant. On the alcohol-control trials, each picture pair
was presented eight times: four times with the alcohol pic-
ture on the left, and four times with the alcohol picture on
the right, and within this the probe replaced alcohol and
control pictures with equal frequency. There was an inter-
trial interval of 1000 ms, and the task took approximately
ten minutes to complete. Reaction times to the probes and
errors (pressing the wrong button or failing to respond
within the response window) were recorded.Stimulus–response Compatibility (SRC) task
Participants were required to categorise alcohol-related
and control pictures by moving a manikin (matchstick
man) towards or away from the pictures as quickly as
possible. The standard version of the task (Field et al.
2008; Field et al. 2005) is split into two blocks: in one
block, participants must ‘approach’ the alcohol pictures
and ‘avoid’ the control pictures. In the other block, these
instructions are reversed. If participants are faster to re-
spond on the ‘approach alcohol’ block compared to the
‘avoid alcohol’ block, this suggests that alcohol cues
activate automatic approach tendencies, the pattern that
is generally seen in heavy, non-dependent drinkers
(Christiansen et al. 2012; Field et al. 2011; Field et al.
2008; see Field et al. 2011, for discussion of underlying
psychological mechanisms).
This standard version of the task provides an index of
automatic approach tendencies that is relative to auto-
matic avoidance tendencies; therefore, it is impossible to
ascertain whether the pattern of results reported in heavy
drinkers is indicative of strong automatic approach, weak
automatic avoidance, or a combination of the two. We
modified the task for the present study so that we were
able to quantify automatic alcohol approach and avoid-
ance tendencies independently of each other. This version
of the task included neutral movements (to the side) in
addition to the standard approach and avoidance move-
ments, and was split into four blocks instead of two.
On each trial, following presentation of the forward
mask, prime and backward mask (as detailed above), a
picture was presented in the centre of the screen and a
small manikin was presented either directly above or
below the picture. Participants were required to rapidly
move the manikin towards the picture (approach move-
ment), away from the picture (avoidance movement) or
to the side (neutral movement) depending on task in-
structions, by pressing one of three keyboard keys that
were labelled ‘up’, ‘down’ and ‘left’ (or ‘right’). Participants
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible and
within a response window of 700 ms. Allocation of the
sideways movement to left or right keys was counterba-
lanced across participants across experimental groups.
The task consisted of four blocks of trials, the order of
which was counterbalanced across groups. Each block
comprised 12 practice trials (not analysed) followed by
56 critical trials. A subset of seven of the alcohol-related
and matched stationery pictures described above were
used in this task. The four blocks had different instruc-
tions: 1) move the manikin towards alcohol-related pic-
tures and to the side for stationery pictures (‘approach
alcohol’ block); 2) move the manikin towards stationery
pictures and to the side for alcohol-related pictures (‘ap-
proach control’ block); 3) move the manikin away from
alcohol-related pictures and to the side for stationery
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from stationery pictures and to the side for alcohol-related
pictures (‘avoid stationery’ block). Correct responses
caused the manikin to move in the appropriate direc-
tion in a short animation that lasted 500 ms; incorrect
responses led to the presentation of a large red ‘X’ in
the centre of the screen for 500 ms. In each block, each
picture was presented four times each, twice with the
manikin above and twice with the manikin below the
picture. Trials were presented in a random order within
each block. There was an intertrial interval of 1000 ms,
and the task took approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Reaction times to initiate movement of the manikin and
errors (pressing the wrong button or failing to respond
within the response window) were recorded.
Prime visibility measure
We devised a forced choice recognition task to check
participants’ awareness of the word primes that were
presented during the masked priming procedure. This is
an established method for evaluating prime visibility
(Degner et al. 2007). On each trial of the task, a masked
prime word was individually presented in the centre of
the screen under exactly the same conditions as those
applied during the SRC and visual probe tasks (i.e. with
a forward mask for 500 ms, prime word for 34 ms and
finally a backward mask for 51 ms). Following this, two
prime words were displayed on screen, one of which was
the prime word previously displayed (i.e. the target) and
another was a different prime word. Participants were
asked to press the left or right key on the keyboard to
indicate which word they thought they had seen. Par-
ticipants completed 20 trials of this forced recognition
test; the primes presented were the same as those
shown during the SRC and visual probe tasks (either
alcohol-appetitive, alcohol-aversive, or neutral). No time-
out was applied, so participants could take as long as they
wished to respond on each trial. The task took less than
two minutes to complete. The dependent variable was the
percentage of prime words that were correctly identified,
and we anticipated that participants would respond at
chance levels, i.e. with 50% accuracy.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet, private
room at their place of work. After providing informed
consent, participants were breathalysed using a Lion
Alcolmeter (Lion Laboratories, Barry, UK) to confirm a
zero breath alcohol level. Participants then provided
demographic information before the laptop computer
was set up exactly 50 cm in front of them. Participants
then completed the SRC and visual probe tasks; the
order of task completion was counterbalanced across
groups. Verbal instructions emphasised the importanceof rapid responding, and the experimenter did not men-
tion the word primes. Participants then completed the
prime visibility measure before completing the AAAQ,
AUDIT and TLFB questionnaires. The entire session
took approximately 45 minutes, and participants were
thoroughly debriefed at the end of the study. Partici-
pants received a £10 shopping voucher as compensation
for their travel expenses and time.
Data analysis
Given that a strict response window was applied on the
SRC and visual probe tasks, we anticipated a higher rate
of errors compared to the standard versions of the task
in which either a very relaxed (typically at least 1 s)
response window is applied, or no response window is
applied at all. Box and whisker plots of the error data for
both tasks suggested that up to 40% errors could be per-
mitted before participants should be excluded from ana-
lyses due to an outlying error rate. This resulted in the
loss of 22 participants’ data from the SRC task, eight
from the 50 ms block of the visual probe task and six
from the 500 ms block of the visual probe task. For the
remaining participants, the mean number of errors on
the tasks was 19% for the SRC task, 9% for the 50 ms
visual probe task and 5% for the 500 ms visual probe
task.
For the remaining trials, we excluded data from individ-
ual trials if response latencies were faster than 100 ms. To
deal with outliers, data were discarded on trials when reac-
tion times exceeded the participants’ mean reaction times
by three standard deviations. For participants retained in
the analyses, on average 22% of data was lost for the SRC
task, 10% for the 50 ms visual probe task, and 6% for




Participants completed 20 trials of the forced recogni-
tion task. The range of correct responses was 5 to 17
(M = 10.32, SD = 2.55). A one-sample t-test indicated that
performance on this task was at chance levels, i.e. not sig-
nificantly different from 10, the 50% level t(110) = 1.3,
p > .20. Furthermore, only three participants (one from
each group) were correct on sixteen or more trials
(more than two standard deviations above the sample
mean), and at the end of the task participants were
asked if they had been able to see the prime words, and
all participants indicated that they could not see the
words and they had been guessing during the prime
visibility task. However, there was a significant group
difference in accuracy on the prime visibility check
(F(2, 110) = 3.54, p = .033, η2p = .06). Although this
difference appears to reflect superior accuracy in the
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both alcohol-appetitive and alcohol-aversive groups,
who did not differ from each other (both M = 10.00
correct trials), post-hoc Bonferroni contrasts revealed that
the differences between control and alcohol-appetitive
(p = .066) and alcohol-aversive (p = .072) groups were
not statistically significant.Visual probe task (Figures 1 and 2)
We performed a 3 × 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA with group
(alcohol-appetitive, alcohol-aversive and control) as the
between-subjects factor and task block (50 ms and
500 ms) and trial type (incongruent, congruent and
neutral-neutral) as within-subjects factors. The hypothe-
sised group × trial type interaction was not significant
(F(4, 192) = 1.31, p = .27, η2p = .03). There was a signifi-
cant main effect of task block F(1, 96) = 9.78, p = .002,
η2p = .09, which was subsumed under a significant task
block x trial type interaction F(2, 182) = 4.57, p = 0.014,
η2p = .05. The 3 way interaction group x trial type x task
block was also not statistically significant (F(4, 192) = .45,
p = .76, η2p = .01), and there were no other significant main
effects or interactions (Fs < 1.26, ps > .2).
We conducted paired samples t-tests to investigate the
interaction. These revealed that on the 50 ms block, par-
ticipants were significantly faster to respond on incongru-
ent trials compared to both congruent trials, t(101) = 2.43,
p = .017, and neutral-neutral trials, t(101) = 3.12, p = .002.
Therefore, all participants showed attentional avoidance
of alcohol pictures presented for 50 ms, which was con-
trary to expectations. On the 500 ms block, there were no
significant differences between trial types (all ps > .05).SRC task (Figure 3)
Mean reaction times during each block of the task
were also analysed using a mixed design ANOVA with
response type (approach, avoidance) and picture type
(alcohol, control) as the within-subjects factors and
group as the between-subjects factor. The hypothesised
group x response type x picture type interaction was not
statistically significant (F(1,85) = 1.30, p = .28, η2p = .03).
However, there was a significant interaction between
response type and picture type (F(1,85) = 6.16, p = .015,
η2p = .07). Paired samples t-tests revealed that participants
tended to be faster to approach rather than avoid alcohol
pictures, although this difference only approached signifi-
cance (t(87) = 1.86, p = .07), but latencies to approach and
avoid control pictures did not differ (t(87) = 1.23, p = .22).
Furthermore, comparisons between categorisation la-
tencies for alcohol and control pictures demonstrated
that participants tended to be slower to avoid alcohol
rather than control pictures (again, this difference only
approached significance; t(87) = 1.86, p = .07), but latenciesto approach alcohol and control pictures did not differ
(t(87) = 1.07, p = .29).
There was also a significant interaction between re-
sponse type and group (F(2,85) = 3.71, p < .05, η2p = .08).
This interaction was not hypothesised so we did not
conduct post-hoc tests in order to unravel it, although
inspection of group differences in Figure 3 suggests that
participants in the neutral group tended to respond fas-
ter on approach blocks relative to avoidance blocks over-
all. No further significant main effects or interactions
were found (Fs < 1.23, ps > .2).
Finally, we also conducted the same mixed design
ANOVA on the error data (frequency of errors during
each block of the task). There were no significant main
effects or interactions (Fs < 2.98, ps > .09).
Correlations between variables
Pearson’s correlations were employed to investigate the
relationship between attentional bias, approach and
avoidance indices from the SRC task, and scores on the
three subscales of the AAAQ, alcohol consumption, and
scores on the AUDIT. Attentional bias was calculated
for each block of the visual probe task (50 ms and
500 ms SOAs) by subtracting mean reaction times on
congruent trials (trials where the probe replaces an alco-
hol picture) from mean reaction times on incongruent
trials (where the probe replaces the neutral picture) such
that a positive score is indicative of attentional bias for
alcohol pictures. On the SRC task, approach bias was
calculated by subtracting the mean reaction times on the
‘approach alcohol’ block from the mean reaction times
on the ‘approach control’ block; avoidance bias was cal-
culated by subtracting the mean reaction times on the
‘avoid alcohol’ block from the mean reaction time on the
‘avoid control’ block.
Analysis revealed weak positive correlations between at-
tentional bias on the 500 ms SOA block and total scores
on the AUDIT, r = .20, (N = 104), p (two-tailed) = .047.
There were no other significant correlations.
Discussion
Contrary to expectations, we found no effects of masked
priming of motivational orientations on attentional bias
for alcohol cues, or on automatic approach and avoid-
ance tendencies evoked by those cues. Given that we de-
veloped novel methods for use in this study, we first
consider methodological issues that may account for
these results, before discussing their theoretical and clin-
ical implications.
Our line of investigation was inspired by research into
dietary restraint, another domain in which motivational
conflict within both automatic and controlled processes
is thought to be important (Stroebe et al. 2013). One
study, Stroebe et al. (2008) demonstrated that subliminal
Figure 1 Response times during the 50 ms block of the visual probe task during congruent trials (probe replaces alcohol picture) and
incongruent trials (probe replaces neutral picture). The dashed line indicates reaction time on neutral-neutral trials, for comparison. Data from
the alcohol-appetitive group are in panel (a), from the alcohol-aversive group in panel (b) and from the control group in panel (c). Values are
mean ± SEM.
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Figure 2 Response times during the 500 ms block of the visual probe task during congruent trials (probe replaces alcohol picture) and
incongruent trials (probe replaces neutral picture). The dashed line indicates reaction time on neutral-neutral trials, for comparison. Data from
the alcohol-appetitive group are in panel (a), from the alcohol-aversive group in panel (b) and from the control group in panel (c). Values are
mean ± SEM.
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appetising properties of food) led to immediate but transi-
ent suppression of a competing motivational orientation
(dieting to lose weight). On this basis, we hypothesisedthat subliminal priming of an alcohol-appetitive motiv-
ational orientation would strengthen the automatic appeti-
tive properties of alcohol cues, and weaken the automatic
aversive properties of alcohol cues, as indicated by changes
Figure 3 Response times during the modified Stimulus–response
Compatibility (SRC) task. The bars indicate sub-blocks of the task,
and indicate which stimulus had to be approached or avoided on that
sub-block. Data from the alcohol-appetitive group are in panel (a), from
the alcohol-aversive group in panel (b) and from the control group in
panel (c). Values are mean ± SEM.
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tendencies evoked by those cues. We also predicted that
priming of an alcohol-aversive motivational orientation
would lead to exactly the opposite pattern of results.
However, our data clearly did not support these hypoth-
eses, because the subliminal priming manipulation had
no effect whatsoever on our measures of automatic al-
cohol cognitions.
In order to interpret these findings, we first consider
possible methodological issues. Firstly, no previous studies
have incorporated a masked priming procedure within
trials of the visual probe and SRC tasks. These aspects
of the experimental procedure were implemented fol-
lowing a critical summary of the available literature on
masked priming (Greenwald et al. 1996; Hermans et al.
2003; Wentura and Degner 2010; Wentura et al. 2005).
The masked priming procedure necessitated presenta-
tion of a masked prime before each trial of the visual
probe and SRC tasks, together with imposition of a re-
sponse window at the end of each trial. In hindsight, we
suggest that the imposition of a response window, in
particular, may have invalidated the primary dependent
measure (manual reaction time) from these tasks. In
standard versions of these tasks participants are pressured
to respond quickly but the response windows applied are
normally fairly generous (typically upwards of 1 s). The
imposition of more stringent response windows in the
present study (500 ms for the visual probe task, 700 ms
for the SRC task), while essential for the demonstration of
masked priming effects (Draine and Greenwald 1998) may
have increased the time pressure on participants to such
an extent that this masked the (typically subtle) differences
between experimental conditions that are usually seen
with these tasks. The high error rates on all tasks (error
rates include responses that were too slow), which were
expected but were still noticeably higher than those seen
when conventional versions of these tasks are used, lend
credibility to this argument. For example, the error rate
for the modified SRC task used in this study was 19%, as
opposed to the 4-6% error rate that is seen with standard
versions of the task that do not apply a response window
(Field et al. 2008, 2011; Kersbergen et al. 2014).
Another methodological issue is the inclusion of a
sideways (left or right) movement in the SRC task, which
was intended as a neutral condition, distinct from ap-
proach or avoidance. This modification was informed by
previous work demonstrating that the labels given to ap-
proach and avoidance movements are more important
than the direction of the movements themselves (e.g.
Eder and Rothermund 2008). We believe that the spe-
cific method used in the present study is an improve-
ment on our first attempt to include a neutral control
condition for this task (Barkby et al. 2012). However it
is possible that our participants may have encoded the
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that the manikin’s starting position was always directly
above or below the picture, and therefore the sideways
movement involved moving ‘away’ (see Krieglmeyer et al.
2010). Future research should aim to identify an optimal
neutral or control movement in order to distinguish be-
tween automatic approach and avoidance tendencies
evoked by different cues.
If we are to assume that the present findings cannot
be attributed to methodological implications of the tasks
used, we must consider the broader theoretical implica-
tions of these findings. Prior research has demonstrated
that more overt manipulations of the motivational orien-
tation to drink, or to refrain from drinking, have a clear
influence on attentional bias for alcohol cues. For ex-
ample, administration of a ‘priming’ dose of alcohol leads
to increased desire to drink alcohol that is paralleled by an
increase in attentional bias for alcohol cues (reviewed in
Field et al. 2010). Conversely, if alcohol is made aversive
by adulterating the taste of an alcoholic drink with a bit-
tering agent, this leads to a reduction in attentional bias
for alcohol cues (Rose et al. 2013). However, the former
effects are not consistently seen (Christiansen et al.
2013; Fernie et al. 2012; Miller and Fillmore 2011;
Weafer and Fillmore 2013) which is problematic for
theoretical models that posit strong inter-relationships
between attentional bias and the motivation to drink
or consume other addictive substances (Field and Cox
2008; Franken 2003). The effects of experimental ma-
nipulation of motivational orientations to drink on
various measures of automatic approach and avoidance
tendencies have also been investigated, with mixed
findings (Christiansen et al. 2013; Fernie et al. 2012;
see Watson et al. 2012, for a review). However, overt
manipulations of negative mood appear to increase
attentional biases (e.g. Field and Powell 2007; Grant
et al. 2007) and automatic approach tendencies for al-
cohol cues, at least in some subgroups of participants
(Ostafin and Brooks 2011; Cousijn et al. 2014). Aside
from these effects of negative mood, it appears that
even very overt manipulations of the motivation to drink
or to refrain from drinking do not have particularly robust
effects on automatic alcohol cognitions, particularly auto-
matic approach tendencies. To our knowledge, the present
study is the first to investigate this issue using a subliminal
priming manipulation, and the clear failure of this ma-
nipulation should be considered in the context of these
previous studies. The overall implication is that automatic
alcohol cognitions may be relatively immune to short-
term experimental manipulations of the motivation to
drink or to refrain from drinking. Disparate to the domain
of dietary restriction (Stroebe et al. 2008) the present study
suggests that even subliminal priming of motivational ori-
entations may have no influence on automatic processingof alcohol cues. If confirmed, this would have important
clinical implications. For example, automatic appetitive al-
cohol cognitions are thought to play a causal role in the
development and maintenance of alcohol use disorders,
and in relapse to heavy drinking after a period of abstin-
ence. Direct manipulation of automatic processes, for
example through repeated practice of alcohol-avoidance
movements, may be the only way to change the under-
lying associations (Wiers et al. 2013).
Finally, we note some interesting secondary findings
from our study. Participants were slower to avoid alco-
hol pictures rather than control pictures on the modified
SRC task, but latencies to approach alcohol and control
pictures did not differ. This has important implications
for our understanding of the psychological mechanisms
that underlie performance on this and similar measures
of automatic approach tendencies, particularly whether
any biases reflects strong approach associations or weak
avoidance associations, or both (cf. Field et al. 2008;
Ostafin et al. 2003). Regarding attentional bias, we found
that all participants tended to shift their attention away
from alcohol pictures that were presented for 50 ms, but
no attentional bias was present when pictures were
presented for 500 ms. Neither of these findings were
anticipated on the basis of previous studies, which have
shown attentional bias for alcohol pictures presented
for 500 ms but no bias for pictures presented for very
brief durations in non-dependent heavy drinkers (Field
and Cox 2008). However, the previous discussion about
the imposition of a response window rendering the re-
action time measure of attentional bias invalid should
be considered here. Alternatively, participants may have
attempted to avoid looking at alcohol cues given that most
were tested at a time of day (during the daytime) and loca-
tion (at their place of work) where drinking alcohol was
not permitted or socially acceptable. Future studies of this
type should be more mindful of the importance that broad
contextual factors may play in the expression of automatic
cognitive processing biases. Finally, the observed positive
correlation between scores on the AUDIT and attentional
bias for alcohol cues at 500 ms are consistent with pre-
vious findings demonstrating that attentional bias for
alcohol cues is associated with heavy drinking (Field
and Cox 2008).
Conclusions
We failed to find support for our hypotheses that impli-
cit priming of alcohol-appetitive or alcohol-aversive
motivational states would influence attentional biases
and approach tendencies evoked by alcohol-related cues.
We developed a novel methodology to test our hypotheses
and features of the methods used may account for our re-
sults. Nonetheless, our results suggest that automatic alco-
hol cognitions cannot be influenced by subliminal priming
Baker et al. BMC Psychology 2014, 2:28 Page 12 of 13
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ant theoretical and clinical implications.
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